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There is a plethora of meat-borne hazards – including parasites - for which there may be a need for 18 
surveilance. However, veterinary services worldwide need to decide how to use their scarce resources and 19 
prioritize among the perceived hazards. Moreover, to remain competitive, food business operators – 20 
irrespective of whether they are farmers or abattoir operators - are preoccupied with maintaining a profit 21 
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and minimizing costs. Stil, customers and trade partners expect that meat products placed on the market 22 
are safe to consume and should not bear any risks of causing disease. 23 
Risk-based surveilance systems may ofer a solution to this chalenge by applying risk analysis principles; first 24 
to set priorities, and secondly to alocate resources efectively and eficiently. The latter is done through a 25 
focus on the cost-efectiveness ratio in sampling. Risk-based surveilance was originaly introduced into 26 
veterinary public health in 2006. Since then, experience has been gathered, and the methodology has been 27 
further developed. Guidelines and tools have been developed, which can be used to set up appropriate 28 
surveilance programmes. In this paper, the basic principles are described, and by use of a surveilance design 29 
tool caled SURVTOOLS (https://survtools.org/), examples are given covering three meat-borne parasites for 30 
which risk-based surveilance is 1) either in place in the European Union (EU) (Trichinela spp.), 2) soon to be 31 
oficialy implemented (Taenia saginata) or 3) only carried out by one abattoir company in the EU as there is 32 
no oficial EU requirement (Toxoplasma gondi). Moreover, advantages, requirements and limitations of risk-33 
based surveilance for meat-borne parasites are discussed. 34 
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1. Introduction 38 
There is a plethora of meat-borne hazards, which represent a potental risk to humans. In the European Union 39 
(EU), bacteria such as Campylobacter spp. and Salmonela spp. are causing the highest number of human 40 
foodborne disease cases (EFSA/ECDC, 2018). However, not just the number of cases but also the severity of 41 
infection is relevant when judging the importance of a hazard. To include this, the WHO Foodborne Disease 42 
Burden Epidemiology Reference Group (FERG) estimated the disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs1) of various 43 
                              
1 DALYs are calculated by adding the number of life years lost due to mortality (YLL) to the number of years lived with 
disability due to morbidity (YLD): DALY = YLL + YLD (FERG, 2015) 
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potential foodborne hazards including microbiological and chemical contaminants. The FERG report contains 44 
a list of prioritised food-borne parasites, and among these, some are meat-borne (FERG, 2015). Among the 45 
meat-borne parasites, Taenia solium was identified as associated with the highest burden of disease, 46 
resulting in a world total of 2.8 milion DALYs, in particular on the African continent. Toxoplasma gondi came 47 
in third, with 1.7 milion DALYs, and Trichinela spp. was identifed as the hazard with the lowest burden of 48 
disease, 550 DALYs, among the al the hazards included in the final FERG analysis (FERG, 2015). 49 
In a world with unlimited resources, there would be surveilance in place for al potential hazards. But 50 
resources are scarce and both private and public decision-makers need to take decisions on what hazards 51 
and activities to prioritise and how to use existing resources eficiently. Such processes are complicated by a 52 
variety of (and sometimes competing) demands; food business operators being under pressure to operate 53 
in a profitable manner, customers and trade partners expecting safe and afordable products, and public 54 
services being asked to ensure that food systems function reliably to the benefit of many in society.  55 
Risk-based surveilance and control may ofer a solution to the chalenge by applying risk analysis principles; 56 
first to set priorities and secondly to alocate resources, efectively and eficiently. Risk-based surveilance 57 
makes use of information about the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the biological 58 
and/or economic consequence of health hazards to plan, design and/or interpret the results obtained 59 
from surveilance systems. 60 
Risk-based surveilance and control was originaly introduced into veterinary public health by Stärk et al. 61 
(2006). Since then, the approach has been used in many countries for a range of hazards, validated and 62 
refined. Guidelines and tools have been developed that can assist, when setting up a risk-based surveilance 63 
programme adequate for the issue and including the context. The approach has already been used for 64 
Trichinela spp., but there is scope for enhanced use of risk-based surveilance with the potential to increase 65 
cost-efectiveness of surveilance for similar pathogens.  66 
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In this paper, the basic principles of risk-based surveilance are described. Next, the surveilance of three 67 
meat-borne parasites is described using the so-caled SURVTOOLS (https://survtools.org/) approach (Fig. 1), 68 
which was developed as part of the RISKSUR project (https://www.fp7-risksur.eu/). The parasites are 69 
Trichinela spp., Taenia saginata and Toxoplasma gondi. The first two were chosen because they are 70 
covered in international legislation and risk-based surveilance is either in place (Trichinela) or soon to be 71 
implemented (T. saginata) in the EU. As the last example, T. gondi was chosen, because the FERG report 72 
identified this hazard as the third-most important parasite worldwide (FERG, 2015), although no oficial 73 
requirements for surveilance are in place in the EU. By use of these selected, ilustrative examples, the 74 
progress made in risk-based surveilance for meat-borne parasites, the implications thereof, and the 75 
opportunities for the future are described and discussed. 76 
 77 
2. Basic principles of risk-based surveilance and control 78 
In the RISKSUR project it was suggested that risk-based surveilance could include one of several of 79 
the folowing four elements: Risk-based prioritisation, risk-based sampling, risk-based requirement, 80 
and risk-based analysis. Risk-based prioritisation involves a determination of which hazards to select 81 
for surveilance, based upon the probability of their occurrence and associated consequences. Risk-82 
based sampling covers designing a sampling strategy to reduce the cost or enhance the accuracy of 83 
surveilance by preferentialy sampling strata (e.g. age groups or geographical areas) within the 84 
target population that are more likely to be exposed, afected, detected, become afected, transmit 85 
infection or cause other consequences (e.g. large economic losses or trade restrictions). Risk-based 86 
requirement deals with use of prior or additional information about the probability of hazard 87 
occurrence to revise the surveilance intensity required to achieve the stated surveilance purpose. 88 
Risk-based analysis make use of prior or additional information about the probability of hazard 89 
occurrence, including contextual information and prior likelihood of disease to revise conclusions 90 




2.1. Setting the priorities – Risk-based prioritisation 93 
The higher purpose is mitigation, where surveilance and intervention are two elements of the mitigation 94 
aim. Surveilance provides the information, intervention the action. But an intervention is not always 95 
necessary. Therefore, first it should be assessed where there is a need for surveilance, why, and which kind 96 
of knowledge is expected to be provided by the surveilance. This is general for al kinds of surveilance. This 97 
constitutes the strategic part of the analysis. Often, it starts with a perceived or actual risk that needs to be 98 
dealt with or a requirement set by regulatory bodies. In the present context, risk is seen as the product of 99 
probability of the occurrence of the hazards and the extent of biologic and/or economic 100 
consequences of their occurrence. Regarding consequences, these may include production losses, animal 101 
welfare problems, human disease (specific to zoonotic infections), trade loss, reputation loss, loss of 102 
ecosystem services and food security. 103 
Perturbations may be defined as a deviation of a system or process from its regular or normal state or path, 104 
caused by an outside influence. If a high capacity to cope with perturbations is judged as vital by decision-105 
makers or society, indicators of consequences might be required as part of the surveilance. In international 106 
trade in meat, findings of unwanted hazards such as Salmonela, residues or Trichinela may be interpreted 107 
as incidents leading to perturbations – such as withdrawal of the meat from the market or a ban on export. 108 
In line, outbreaks due to foodborne hazards may result in consumer boycotts, leading to a switch to other 109 
products. Hence, one sector’s loss may be another sector’s gain. Moreover, in extreme cases as currently 110 
seen with the spreading of African swine fever, food security issues on a local market due to culing of many 111 
infected herds may evolve unless handled by the government. 112 
Governments and the livestock sector often have ambitions for improving public and/or animal health 113 
and/or expanding the access to the export market. If improvement of public and animal health is the 114 
objective, information about the burden of diferent diseases is the basis, for humans as wel as animals. 115 
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The FERG Report may come in useful for public health as it contains an assessment of the human burden of 116 
diferent foodborne diseases in the world, divided into regions (FERG, 2015). Next, a source account is 117 
needed, whereby the contribution to human exposure of each kind of food consumed is assessed. For 118 
example, if the highest burden of foodborne disease is ascribed to campylobacteriosis, and poultry meat is 119 
the main source, then the value of surveilance in pig meat would be limited. For animal health, disease 120 
recordings may also be considered a good indicator for productivity, in the absence of recording systems 121 
for production. 122 
If access to a foreign market is the objective, then first an identification of the requirements regarding food 123 
safety and the zoo-sanitary status for the foreign market is needed. Next, establishment of a specific 124 
surveilance may be required. Although the outcome of a burden of disease assessment and a source account 125 
may show that a specific risk is negligible in given commodity, a surveilance may stil be needed - if required 126 
by the importing country. That could be the case for Trichinela in pig meat. After access to the foreign 127 
market, a continued documentation of a high zoo-sanitary status and food safety level may be essential, 128 
requiring continued surveilance. Alternatively, bilateral negotiations may lead to acceptance of equivalence 129 
on other terms such as a risk-based surveilance in the high-risk sub-population. A country may be in a 130 
position where it is considered too costly to implement certain food safety standards for the entire 131 
production. In response, the country may decide to limit the surveilance programme to animals due for 132 
export, or farms or abattoirs that export their produce, to be able to export to countries with a high level of 133 
animal health or food safety. 134 
  135 
2.2. Designing the surveilance - risk-based sampling 136 
Once the relevant hazards have been identified, then technical and operational considerations should be 137 
made regarding how to design the surveilance. Here, the surveilance objective should be further defined, 138 
and surveilance designers should discuss which kind of surveilance is needed to meet the objective. 139 
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Surveilance involves use of the obtained information for decision-making regarding whether to initiate 140 
action or not. For example, actions may be required when positive samples are found or when the prevalence 141 
gets above a certain accepted threshold. In contrast, monitoring difers from surveilance in the sense that 142 
no actions are planned (Hoinvile et al., 2013). In the folowing, “design of surveilance” is used in a broad 143 
meaning, not diferentiating between monitoring or surveilance. During the design of surveilance, design 144 
tools may be used. One example is the SURVTOOLS, which guides the user through key elements of 145 
surveilance (Fig. 1). Such a standardized approach ensures that al elements are carefuly considered before 146 
decisions are taken. 147 
Information about the biology of the hazard is commonly needed when designing surveilance. For parasites 148 
this implies the lifecycle. Moreover, information about the prevalence of infection in diferent animal species, 149 
knowledge about risk factors, ways of spreading and the efects of infection or disease is relevant. Al this 150 
information may be used to identify where the risk is high, enabling targeting of sampling to the sub-151 
populations or commodities that harbor the highest risk (Stärk et al., 2006). As described above, in the 152 
context of risk-based surveilance, risk is seen as the product of probability and consequences. Therefore, the 153 
highest risk may be found either in the population strata with the highest expected prevalence of the hazard 154 
or the strata, where the impacts of having the hazard may be highest.  155 
Unlike bacterial foodborne pathogens, where cross-contamination and bacterial growth along the food chain 156 
is a major concern, meat-borne parasites do not multiply in the food chain. It is important to identify infected 157 
animals or their products in food systems to manage the risk and avoid human exposure. Risk-based sampling 158 
may be focusing on meat originating from animals raised outdoors and not indoors – if outdoor-raising is 159 
perceived as a risk factor for the hazard of concern. Moreover, one should have a view on the intended use 160 
of the meat. If the hazard is eliminated during processing, then there wil be no need for surveilance in that 161 
part of the production or afterwards. But there may be a need for surveilance in another part of production. 162 




Feasibility of sampling and its cost-efectiveness are also important to consider. In 2011, EFSA introduced the 165 
concept of harmonised epidemiological indicators, consisting either of direct measurements of the hazard 166 
itself or an indirect measurement based upon the production system. Using the latter approach, a farm or a 167 
herd could be categorized into low- or high-risk (EFSA, 2011a). Regarding direct measurements, sampling at 168 
the abattoir is easier and cheaper than sampling on the farm, because for each abattoir there is a high 169 
number of farms delivering animals for slaughter. Choice of laboratory methods requires considerations 170 
regarding whether a high sensitivity or a high specificity is needed – and whether more methods should be 171 
used and interpreted, in paralel or in series. Regarding choice of sampling material (matrix) to use in the 172 
laboratory, meat may be easier to colect than blood. However, care should be taken before deciding, 173 
because the laboratory method may have been validated for one matrix and not for another. Finaly, when 174 
estimating the prevalence of a given infection, the test characteristics need to be considered as wel as the 175 
cut-of used when judging whether an individual sample is positive or not. Here, parasites may represent a 176 
chalenge as many diferent tests are available and used, unfortunately sometimes without knowing the 177 
sensitivity and the specificity, hampering comparisons of prevalence estimates (Felin et al., 2017; Olsen et 178 
al., 2019). 179 
 180 
3. Surveilance for Trichinela 181 
Trichinela infection in humans may result in life-threatening disease. Trichinela was first detected in its larval 182 
form in a human cadaver in 1835 and in a human clinical case in 1859 (Campbel, 1983). Folowing this 183 
discovery, many European countries implemented inspection and control of Trichinela in meat using 184 
trichinoscopy (Boireau et al., 2015). In the USA, Trichinela testing was also put in place, but mainly with a 185 
focus on export of pork to Europe. Today, Trichinela is under control not just in Europe and the US, but in 186 
most parts of the world and is, therefore, associated with a low burden of disease worldwide (FERG, 2015). 187 
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Several animal species may get infected with Trichinela, although consumption of meat from pigs, horses 188 
and wildlife has been ascribed to most of the human cases observed. Trichinela infection can only occur if 189 
an animal or a human ingest muscle tissue containing infective larvae (Gamble et al., 2019). This implies that 190 
infection cannot spread from one pig to the next, unless cannibalism takes place. It also means that feeding 191 
of raw waste containing infected meat to pigs (which is not alowed in the EU due to the probability of 192 
spreading infectious disease such as African or Classical swine fever), as wel as unsafe handling of dead 193 
animals are major risk factors. Moreover, presence of a high number of rodents and outdoor-raising of pigs 194 
have been identified as risk factors. The longer an animal lives, the higher is the probability that it may get 195 
exposed. Therefore, age may be interpreted as a risk factor. 196 
The general surveilance for Trichinela in the EU is described in Table 1, based upon Alban & Petersen (2016) 197 
and the EU legislation (Anon., 2015). Until 2014, al pigs raised in the EU were supposed to be tested, unless 198 
the Member State had obtained an oficial recognition of having a negligible risk of Trichinela in its domestic 199 
pigs, which only Denmark and Belgium had obtained (Alban & Petersen, 2016). Then, the EU legislation 200 
adopted a risk-based approach for surveilance of Trichinela in pigs and oficialy required testing only of pigs 201 
raised in the low-biosecurity compartment, such as outdoors or backyard production (caled the non-202 
controled compartment in the EU). As an intermediate stage, a Member State was obliged to test 10% of 203 
the pigs (finishers, sows or boars) from the controled housing compartment. This was to continue until the 204 
Member State was able to document, using historical data on continuous testing carried out on slaughtered 205 
swine population, that the prevalence of Trichinela was below 1 per milion in the controled housing 206 
compartment. Denmark and Belgium were excepted from this requirement because of their negligible risk 207 
status (Anon., 2015). The move towards a risk-based sampling was due to an overwhelming amount of data 208 
showing that Trichinela spp. is absent in the controled housing compartment (Alban et al., 2008; Alban et 209 
al., 2011). 210 
This moved focus from testing pigs individualy to auditing of biosecurity on-farm. Such indirect 211 
measurements are much cheaper than testing al pigs for the presence of the parasite, in particular if an 212 
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auditing system is in place already for other reasons (Alban & Petersen, 2016). To ensure acceptance of the 213 
risk-based sampling, compliance with the requirements for controled housing should be checked at regular 214 
intervals and idealy, the frequency of the auditing should be risk-based. These requirements are described 215 
in detail in Annex IV to the EU Trichinela Regulation (Anon., 2015). For many years, the International 216 
Commission of Trichinelosis (ICT2) has published guidelines for pre-harvest control of Trichinela in food 217 
animals. The ICT guidelines have recently been updated (Gamble et al., 2019); they are almost equal to the 218 
requirements listed in the EU Trichinela Regulation. Either the veterinary authorities or a third-party 219 
independent auditor may do the auditing. The latter is undertaken as part of a private standard, building on 220 
top of national and international legislation. Such private standards are common in many parts of the world, 221 
and it may be expected that they wil increase further in use and importance (Alban & Petersen, 2016). 222 
According to the EU legislation, carcasses of horses, wild boar and other farmed and wild animal species 223 
susceptible to Trichinela infection shal be systematicaly sampled in slaughterhouses or game-handling 224 
establishments as part of the post-mortem examination (Anon., 2015). Hence, testing wil only take place if 225 
the meat is intended to be consumed by humans. For foxes or other indicator animals, monitoring is 226 
encouraged but not required in the EU Trichinela Regulation, despite wildlife potentialy having a higher 227 
prevalence of Trichinela spp. than livestock, reflecting that food safety is the overal objective of the 228 
surveilance. Moreover, surveilance in outdoor pigs can be interpreted as an early warning for indoor pigs, 229 
raised in the same geographical area. 230 
Despite the FERG report pointing to a marginal negative impact on human health and the EU legislation 231 
alowing no testing for Trichinela spp. of pigs raised under controled housing conditions, extensive testing 232 
is stil taking place in the EU, because of trade requirements from countries outside the EU (Alban & Petersen, 233 
2016). This shows the importance of international harmonization regarding surveilance and control of the 234 




most common animal health and food safety issues - as it could lead to a more efective distribution of 235 
resources spent on assuring food safety and animal health and welfare. 236 
 237 
4. Surveilance for Taenia saginata 238 
Humans are the definitive host of the cestode T. saginata. If humans are exposed to live cysticerci, by eating 239 
undercooked beef, infection in the form of a tapeworm may develop, where after the tapeworm wil begin 240 
excreting infective eggs. The presence of the tapeworm wil usualy result in very mild infection or no 241 
symptoms at al (Laranjo-González et al., 2016). Contrary to T. solium (the swine tapeworm) the eggs of T. 242 
saginata are not infective to humans (Gerts, 2015). Neurocysticercosis is therefore not related to T. saginata. 243 
Hence, the human burden of disease related to T. saginata is assessed as low, although no precise studies 244 
have been undertaken. In line, the FERG report excluded T. saginata from their priority list due to the 245 
presumed low burden of disease (FERG, 2015).  246 
Infection of cattle with the eggs of T. saginata, resulting from exposure to human feces, results in 247 
development of cysticerci, located in the muscle, enabling infection of humans as described above. Natural 248 
infections in cattle are normaly asymptomatic (Laranjo-González et al., 2016). Like cattle, reindeer and 249 
bufalo can also act as an intermediate host. Exposure of cattle to human fecal material is the main risk factor 250 
for infection of cattle. Taenia infection cannot be spread from one bovine animal to the next. Age is a risk 251 
factor, as it has been documented that animals slaughtered before the age of 2 years has a very low 252 
probability of being infected. Moreover, sex is a risk factor, with male cattle having a lower risk than females 253 
(Calvo-Artavia et al., 2012). However, sex and age at slaughter are confounded, as male cattle are usualy 254 
slaughtered before the age of 2 years, while females are kept longer. 255 
The general surveilance for T. saginata in the cattle in the EU is described in Table 1, based on a systematic 256 




As stated above, the human burden of disease related to T. saginata is assessed as low (FERG, 2015). 259 
Moreover, the prevalence of infected cattle found at meat inspection is very low (Laranjo-González et al., 260 
2016) and the sensitivity of meat inspection of lightly-infected animals is very low, implying that most 261 
infected carcasses are overlooked. Kyvsgaard et al. suggested that the sensitivity for lightly infected animals 262 
was around 15%, (Kyvsgaard et al., 1990). The value of the routine inspection has therefore been questioned 263 
(Calvo-Artavia et al., 2012). Alternative suggestions are risk-based surveilance and/or use of serology 264 
(Laranjo-González et al., 2016). A risk-based approach could involve inspection limited to the high-risk sub-265 
population consisting of adult cows (Calvo-Artavia et al., 2012). Adult cows were also found as the sub-266 
population with the highest prevalence in the United Kingdom (Marshal et al., 2016) and in France (Dupuy 267 
et al., 2014). A new risk-based meat inspection system for bovines, making use of age and production system 268 
as risk factors, wil come into force in December 2019. This wil imply that bovines, either raised indoors and 269 
slaughtered before the age of 20 months, or slaughtered below 8 months of age wil be excepted from 270 
incisions into the masseters (Table 2 and Fig. 2) (Anon., 2019). 271 
Serological tests for detection of antigens or antibodies again T. saginata are available, and the EU Meat 272 
Inspection Regulation 854/2004 alows use of serology as a replacement for meat inspection for T. saginata 273 
(Anon., 2004). However, such tests are associated with additional costs. Therefore, before being 274 
recommended for routine use, the economic eficiency should be carefuly considered. A recent study using 275 
a mathematical model estimated a prevalence of 43% of T. saginata (in the form of viable, degenerated or 276 
calcified cysticerci) in Belgian cattle (Jansen et al., 2018). Somewhat similar, Eichenberger et al. (2013) 277 
estimated the prevalence to be 15.6% in Swiss cattle. This high prevalence warrants further investigations 278 
into the ways that Belgian, Swiss and maybe other cattle get exposed: grazing practices, availability of toilets 279 
for farm workers and others, and handling of the sewage system. In this way, it may be possible to identify 280 
and rectify systematic risky practices in place. This may be more cost-efective than subjecting al Belgian 281 
cattle to a serological test for T. saginata. Alternatively, individual farmers may be interested in documenting 282 
freedom from infection, using serology at meat inspection on a subset of their animals. Such meat would be 283 
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safe to use for ready-to-eat beef products, but a higher price would most likely be required before a larger 284 
number of farmers would embark on this strategy. 285 
 286 
5. Surveilance for Toxoplasma gondi 287 
Felids, such as cats, are the definitive hosts of the protozoan parasite Toxoplasma gondi. Infected felids can 288 
shed milions of oocysts through their feces for a limited time period. Contamination of the environment with 289 
such oocysts takes place through water, soil, feed and food, whereby a wide range of host gets infected. If 290 
Toxoplasma infection takes place in a pregnant woman, infection may result in abortion of the unborn child, 291 
or in life-long impairment of normal functionality of the child. In adults, infection usualy has a mild course 292 
with few symptoms, however there are indications that infection with T. gondi might be associated with 293 
schizophrenia (Burgdorf et al., 2019). According to the FERG report, Toxoplasma gondi is the third-most 294 
important parasite worldwide, associated with 1.7 milion DALYs (FERG, 2015). Consumption of meat has 295 
been ascribed to a large, but unknown proportion of the human cases observed (Cook et al., 2000; FERG, 296 
2015). Freezing and heat treatment render infected meat safe to consume, whereas curing requires that the 297 
meat product is subjected to high saline concentrations over a longer time to be efective (Dubey et al., 1997). 298 
This implies that there are only few meat products which wil contain viable parasites at the time of 299 
consumption. Therefore, ready-to-eat products such as mildly cured products may be considered as high-300 
risk. 301 
Toxoplasma gondi cannot easily be detected directly, but serological testing can be used as an indirect 302 
measurement. According to a recently published systematic review, the seroprevalence is highest in wild 303 
boar folowed by sheep, moose, and cattle, and lowest in indoor finishing pigs (Olsen et al., 2019). For pigs, 304 
Limon et al. identified three confounded risk factors: 1) smal herds, 2) outdoor-rearing and 3) farm cats with 305 
access to sow feed and concluded that in the United Kingdom most batches of pigs delivered to slaughter 306 
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consists of negative animals (Limon et al., 2017). Moreover, sows and boars have a higher probability of being 307 
infected than finishing pigs (Olsen et al., 2019). 308 
The non-negligible importance of T. gondi for human health has been recognized both by WHO (FERG, 2015) 309 
and EFSA. The latter identified T. gondi as a relevant hazard in their Opinion on hazards to be covered by 310 
meat inspection of pigs (EFSA, 201b). Stil, in the EU and elsewhere, there is currently no oficial requirement 311 
for surveilance for T. gondi in any livestock. Overal speaking, the higher purpose is mitigation, where 312 
surveilance and intervention are two elements of mitigation. Surveilance provides the information and 313 
intervention the action, but intervention is not always necessary. The current stage of mitigation may be 314 
caled investigation, and it is about understanding the situation and getting ready for intervention strategies, 315 
if needed (Häsler et al., 2011). Depending upon the outcome of this exercise, the risk manager may decide 316 
upon moving to implementation of a mitigation phase or accept the situation as it is.  317 
 In the folowing, considerations regarding how to set up a future surveilance programme for T. gondi in 318 
swine is described, folowing the key areas defined in SURVTOOLS. The overal objective should be to protect 319 
consumers against being exposed to infective meat. This can be done through identification of herds with an 320 
unacceptable high prevalence of T. gondi (estimate within-herd prevalence). The kind of surveilance to put 321 
in place could be monitoring or surveilance. As age and way of raising are risk factors, there are four potential 322 
sub-populations for which a surveilance component could be set up for swine: finishing pigs/sows combined 323 
with controled housing/non-controled housing. A discussion should be taken to set the threshold between 324 
acceptable and unacceptable, while knowing that such a threshold can later be changed. Experience from 325 
the Danish Salmonela surveilance programme may come in useful; after some years into the programme, 326 
the within-herd seroprevalence of Salmonela was lowered from 70% to 65% for alocating pig herds into the 327 
highest risk category, for which there is requirement for risk mitigation, as described by Alban et al. (2012).  328 
Actions related to detection of an unacceptable high seroprevalence may involve visit at the farm of origin, 329 
including evaluation of current biosecurity practices and correction of potential weak points. Farmers could 330 
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be notified and payed less for their pigs or asked to pay for the folow-up visit on the farm. Outdoor raising 331 
is known as a risk factor, making it a priority to develop recommendations to ensure safe ways of housing 332 
and feeding of outdoor pigs. For herds with an unacceptable high prevalence of T. gondi, a recommendation 333 
could be to freeze meat intended for production of risky ready-to-eat (RTE) products. 334 
Serological testing may constitute a feasible way of detecting herds with a high prevalence. One important 335 
question is whether to initiate surveilance in al four potential sub-populations or not, and if so, how. Here, 336 
a farm categorization may be used in line with what is seen for Trichinela. This could imply that al meat from 337 
the sub-population with the highest prevalence may be considered as high-risk requiring freezing if the meat 338 
is intended for risky RTE products. Folowing upon this view, surveilance may target the low-risk sub-339 
population such as indoor finishing pigs. One drawback about this approach is that a substantial number of 340 
samples would have to be tested before infection can be detected, due to the low prevalence. This issue was 341 
raised by EFSA, who recommended to use auditing of biosecurity for controled housing instead of testing for 342 
T. gondi for low-risk farms (EFSA, 2011a). To make a testing programme economicaly feasible, only few 343 
samples may be taken at each delivery. This would imply that longer time might pass, before infection would 344 
be detected.  345 
Hence, the point of sample colection is the abattoir, and the testing protocol could involve serology (blood) 346 
or meat-juice. Although EFSA recommends use of blood (EFSA, 2011a), colection of meat-juice samples is 347 
much more convenient. The approach used in the Danish Salmonela surveilance in finishing pigs may be 348 
used, implying automatic identification of carcasses to be sampled in the cooling room as described by Alban 349 
et al. (2012). The sampling strategy could be risk-based sampling restricted to either high-risk or low-risk, as 350 
explained further up. The study design could consist of a two-stage sampling, where farms with no test-351 
positives are placed in the low-intensity part of the programme involving e.g. one sample per delivery, and 352 
farms that have tested positive are re-tested in relation to the next delivery of pigs with a higher number of 353 
samples to estimate the within-herd prevalence. 354 
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The choice of cut-of to be used wen judging the individual sample constitutes a chalenge for T. gondi, as 355 
pointed to by Felin et al. (2017). For the low-risk sub-populations such as the indoor finishing pigs, the major 356 
part of the apparently seropositive pigs may be false-positives. An example of this could be seen in a study 357 
by Kofoed et al. (2017). That chalenge could be solved by re-testing more animals from the herd and alowing 358 
a certain number of reactors within a given sampling period. The data handling process would be a 359 
continuous evaluation of samples to confirm the seroprevalence level of each farm. 360 
So far, only one EU abattoir company has a surveilance programme for T. gondi in place, like described 361 
above, implying one sample tested per delivery of pigs from low-risk herds, and six samples from herds with 362 
a higher risk. Farms are re-tested when positives are found to determine the within-herd prevalence more 363 
precisely. A within-herd prevalence below 5% is considered as low-risk, and above 15% as high-risk, and in-364 
between as moderate risk (Heres et al., 2015).  365 
More work is needed before a surveilance programme for T. gondi can be recommended widely. Such work 366 
would include a burden of disease assessment for T. gondi for the country of interest, folowed by a source 367 
account or an exposure assessment for the most important sources of human exposure. That information 368 
could be included in a cost-benefit analysis, addressing diferent kinds of surveilance systems. In Denmark, 369 
a source account has been made for congenital toxoplasmosis, showing a lower annual disease burden than 370 
expected. A total of 123 DALYs was found, of which 78 were due to fetal loss and 2 were due to neonatal 371 
death, and hence 43 DALYs for the persons who wil have to live with congenital toxoplasmosis. This is 372 
substantialy lower than the burden caused by campylobacteriosis (1,586 DALYs) and salmonelosis (379 373 
DALYs) (Nissen et al., 2014). However, this figure does not include the potential burden represented by 374 
schizophrenia, where T. gondi infection might be a contributing causal factor for some cases of schizophrenia 375 
- as suggested by Burgdorf et al. (2019). In Denmark, the next step involves a source account or an exposure 376 




6. Advantages, requirements and limitation related to risk-based surveilance and control 379 
The three examples of surveilance in foodborne parasites presented above show that there are several 380 
advantages of using risk-based surveilance systems: targeted eforts resulting in a better cost-efectiveness 381 
ratio, if planned wel. One example is the Danish Trichinela programme in pigs, where only the pigs from 382 
non-controled housing are subjected to individual testing whereas the controled housing herds are 383 
subjected to auditing of biosecurity practices every 3 years (Alban and Petersen, 2016) Hence, risk-based 384 
surveilance and control harbors the opportunity to achieve the same surveilance performance at lower cost 385 
or to increase performance using the same resources. The approach is based on knowledge of the food 386 
system, the epidemiology of the hazard, contextual factors and risk factors, where sampling can be targeted 387 
to the population strata with the highest risk. 388 
To ensure confidence in risk-based surveilance, documentation of al elements of the risk-based approach is 389 
crucial. Here, reporting guidelines may be useful, and example of this can be found in  390 
https://github.com/SVA-SE/AHSURED. However, in many cases it can be dificult or even impossible to get 391 
enough data to estimate e.g. the size of a risk factor precisely. One example is the area of surveilance for 392 
residues of antimicrobial origin in meat, where a risk-based approach is encouraged (Anon., 1996). Detailed 393 
studies of the cases seen in Denmark indicate that use of injectable antimicrobials is the primary cause and 394 
that a high within-herd prevalence of chronic pleurisy (where treatment is often done using injectable 395 
antimicrobials) may be a risk factor or an indicator. However, the number of cases in Denmark is so low that 396 
it disables a precise estimate of this risk factor. Here, a comparison with Dutch data helped to estimate the 397 
relative risk (Alban et al., 2014; Veldhuis et al., 2018). Stil, prudence should be used to avoid over-confidence, 398 
and the impact of uncertainty on the risk to be estimated should be studied – e.g. in the form of scenario 399 
analysis - to ensure robustness of the system. 400 
Livestock farming is not static; and major shifts in production have been observed in Europe in the last 401 
decades. This implies fewer and larger farms and a specialization, resulting in a change in the trade flows. For 402 
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pigs, a specialization into breeding, growing or finishing farms is taking place (Marquer et al., 2014). 403 
Moreover, the preferences of the consumers are not stationary. Therefore, changes in risk distribution should 404 
be foreseen and incorporated into surveilance e.g. as an early warning system. A solution to this could be to 405 
expand surveilance eforts to food systems to characterize and monitor their changes over time and trigger 406 
alerts of major changes that may require further investigation and adaptation of surveilance programmes. 407 
An example is when livestock is raised in new ways or regions, where there might be an increased exposure 408 
to certain hazards, compared to the traditional production. Outdoor-raising of pigs may be an example of 409 
this – and the combination with an increase in the preference for pink pork may imply a higher exposure to 410 
T. gondi than seen before. Similar considerations should be made regarding climatic changes, which may 411 
lead to presence of infections or vectors of infection not previously seen in the area. For both examples, 412 
focus should be on the capacity of the livestock system to cope with perturbations. 413 
In this paper, risk-based surveilance to ensure safe meat has been the focus. Stil “safe meat” may have 414 
diferent meanings to the consumers, and some may be wiling to take a risk for the taste, e.g. for tartare 415 
(raw beef). This implies that resilience as wel as risk and risk evaluations may vary at diferent levels of the 416 
consumer and production cycle. In line, one group of consumers may perceive outdoor raising as associated 417 
with high animal welfare as wel as a more resilient form of production compared to indoor production. For 418 
others, outdoor production may be perceived as a risk for animal welfare because of exposure to harsh 419 
climatic conditions and as a risk of introduction of various infections. In response, the authorities in 420 
colaboration with the food business operators may need to look more carefuly into how we may frame risk, 421 
production and consumption in a way where the various aspects can be encompassed in a transdisciplinary 422 
process, with many perspectives are considered simultaneously. Knowledge integration and multi-criteria 423 
decision-making is crucial here, but slow, complicated, and dificult to obtain. 424 
Risk-based surveilance require that many kinds of information are gathered and carefuly evaluated. This 425 
implies an opportunity to (re-)assess and evaluate traditional surveilance approaches and identify areas for 426 
enhancement, change or innovation. However, it also encompasses a weakness, because such systems may 427 
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not necessarily be known a priori to the trade partner and the veterinary authorities in the importing country 428 
(Stärk et al., 2006). Hence, any risk-based surveilance programme can only realise its ful economic eficiency 429 
potential, if trade partners and veterinary authorities are informed in detail about the specific approach, 430 
which implies that it should be transparent and evidence-based. Here, it should be borne in mind that trust 431 
is built up gradualy but can be destroyed fast. Furthermore, it may be confusing, if each country defines their 432 
own risk-based surveilance for a given hazard, and some level of harmonization would be useful. To obtain 433 
this, open access to information about surveilance systems would be helpful for the process of identifying 434 
the systems that work best, depending on the settings. In case of sensitive issues, a controled disclosure 435 
could be used.  436 
In the EU legislation, an unclear terminology is sometimes used, such as targeted surveilance, and with no 437 
distinction between monitoring and surveilance. For example, in the EU Residue Directive 96/23, it says: 438 
“The samples must be targeted taking account of the folowing minimum criteria: sex, age, species, fattening 439 
system, al available background information, and al evidence of misuse or abuse of substances of this group” 440 
(Anon., 1996). However, for finishing pigs, which are the large numbers, not much help is provided to identify 441 
how to go risk-based. Although sows have a documented higher probability of harboring residues than 442 
finishing pigs, an extensive surveilance in sows does not help, if the objective is to demonstrate absence in 443 
finishing pigs to a trade partner, as explained by Alban et al. (2018). 444 
In line with the recommendations by Ruegg et al. (2017), a colaboration between authorities, academia and 445 
food business operators should be encouraged. Such a colaboration might make it possible to develop an 446 
efective surveilance for a given hazard or indicator, based upon experience, feasibility and economics. 447 
Hereby, compliance with the surveilance system may be improved. Moreover, surveilance programmes 448 
need to be set up in a way which facilitates control, implying timely actions which can be made in an easy 449 
way. Again, a colaboration with the stakeholders may be beneficial, because it wil also be in the interest of 450 
the stakeholders to ensure fast detection and efective handling of unwanted cases, including trace-back. 451 
This is already recognized by many Food Business Operators who have routine data colection and Hazard 452 
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Analysis of Critical Control points (HACCP) in place for their production. This wil minimize the perturbation 453 
to the system and, hereby, maintain consumer confidence and access to export markets. Stil, in some 454 
cultures or countries, there is a lack of confidence in industry data. Given their business nature, the industry 455 
may have more interest and resources to set up surveilance in the form of own control than the national 456 
authorities. An example of this can be seen in Denmark (Alban et al., 2018) and the Netherlands (Veldhuis et 457 
al., 2019), where the own control for residues of antimicrobial origin is involving many times more samples 458 
than the oficial sampling undertaken in line with the EU Residue Directive (Anon., 1996). However, such 459 
private surveilance data are only of use to public decision-makers (who have a mandate to promote and 460 
protect public health), if the information is shareable and can be trusted. 461 
Development of meat safety assurance systems (MSAS) as suggested by EFSA (2011b) may help to help 462 
categorize farms and slaughterhouses according to the risk they represent. This involves setting appropriate 463 
targets for the final chiled carcasses. Such MSAS would involve a careful selection of harmonized 464 
epidemiological indicators, depending on the purpose and the epidemiological situation in a country. Private 465 
standards covering food are increasingly including MSAS, see for example the Global Red Meat Standards 466 
(https://grms.org/). For more details about the status and the chalenges related to the development of 467 
MSAS, please see Buncic et al. (2019).  468 
Regular evaluation of surveilance is recommendable. This wil among others ensure that the latest technical 469 
achievements are incorporated, the objectives are met, and the cost-efectiveness is maintained. Tools 470 
developed for evaluation should preferably be used, e.g. the SURVTOOLS described above. Such tools as 471 
meant for inspiration to ensure that al relevant issues are dealt with. 472 
A broader evaluation framework to consider has been developed by the Network for Evaluation of One 473 
Health (NEOH). NEOH is intended for the evaluation of any initiative addressing the health of people, animals 474 
and the environment. The framework is based upon a system’s approach and provides a basis for assessing 475 
the integration of knowledge from diverse disciplines, sectors, and stakeholders through a systematic 476 
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description of the system at stake and standardised sets of indicators. It ilustrates how cross-sectoral, 477 
participatory and interdisciplinary approaches evoke characteristic One Health operations, i.e., thinking, 478 
planning, and working, and require supporting infrastructures to alow learning, sharing, and systemic 479 
organisation. It also describes systemic One Health outcomes, which are not necessarily possible to obtain 480 
through sectoral approaches alone (e.g. trust, equity, biodiversity etc.), and their alignment with aspects of 481 
sustainable development based on society, environment, and economy (Ruegg et al., 2017; 482 
http://neoh.onehealthglobal.net/). 483 
Several other tools are currently available for evaluation of surveilance. A comparison of such tools is 484 
currently undertaken in an international project caled “Convergence in evaluation frameworks for integrated 485 
surveilance of AMR: Moving towards a harmonized evaluation approach” (Co-Eval-AMR), where the focus is 486 
on characterizing evaluation tools for evaluation of surveilance systems for antimicrobial resistance. The 487 
intent is to identify which protocols or tools are good at evaluating what and – if possible – to move towards 488 
more harmonized evaluations. The output from this project may provide insights for surveilance in other 489 
fields including meat-borne parasites. 490 
 491 
7. Conclusion 492 
Surveilance and control can be considered a continuous, iteratively adaptive process, which can respond to 493 
changing food systems, risk patterns, consumer behaviors and trade dynamics. It is therefore important that 494 
the surveilance is set up to produce fit-for-purpose information that alows making decisions for control 495 
where needed and react to changing circumstances. Risk-based surveilance systems may imply a higher 496 
efect of surveilance at a lower level of costs, through a targeted focus on the hazard that matter the most 497 
to a society or an industry. Similar considerations should be made for risk management. For meat-borne 498 
parasites, risk-based surveilance is wel-established for Trichinela, and coming into force in December 2019 499 
for T. saginata. For T. gondi, the current oficial mitigation stage is to evaluate how large the risk is, and 500 
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whether intervention is needed. There are opportunities to expand similar principles to other hazards as wel. 501 
Colaboration with the food business operator, consumers, NGOs and other organisations in the food system 502 
should be considered by identification of values, common interests, sharing of data and joint action. Finaly, 503 
the surveilance system should be evaluated in a systematic way on a regular basis to ensure that the 504 
resources spent are providing value for money. 505 
 506 
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Figure captions 632 
 633 
Figure 1. Graphical description of the key areas to consider when setting up surveilance programmes. 634 
Modified after https://survtools.org/ 635 
 636 
Figure 2. Graphical description of a risk-based approach to meat inspection for tuberculosis and T. saginata 637 
cysticercosis in bovines making use of knowledge about the risk factors age, sex and production system. 638 
This approach is part of the new EU Meat Inspection Regulation 2019/627 on bovines coming into force in 639 




Table 1. Overview of selected surveilance design elements for Trichinela and Taenia saginata in the European Union, 2019 642 
Hazard  Objectivesa and 
expected outcome 
Sub-populations 
to consider for  
surveilance 
components 





Testing protocol  Study design  Sampling strategy  Data handling 
Trichinela  Populations not 
free from 
infection: to 
ensure food safety 
by identifying 
infected animals 
and take them out 
of the supply chain 
(case finding) 
Populations free 










risk factors: age 
and production 
system 
1. 1. Indoor finishers 
2. 2. Indoor 
sows/boars 
3. 3. Outdoor 
finishers 




Trace back to the 
farm of origin and 
an investigation 
of the source of 
infection 
Actions to ensure 
a high level of 
biosecurity 
folowing the EU 
requirement for 
controled housing 
as specified in 






of single meat 
pieces or a pooled 




testing for positive 
samples.  
Serology may also 
be used for 
monitoring 
purpose 
On farm: auditing 






the individual pig 
as the target 
 
Census implying that 




pork for export out 
of the EU or high-
risk sub-populations 
such as pigs from 
non-controled 
housing 
If Member State has 
not yet documented 
that prevalence is <1 
per milion, then 
10% of pigs from 
controled housing 













and take them out 





risk factors: sex, 
age, and raising 
1. 1. Young bovines 
2. 2. Adult bovines 
3. 1. Females 
4. 2. Males 
5. 1. Indoor raising 





found in carcass: 
the parts not 
infected may be 




undergone a cold 
treatment 
Many cysticerci 







human sewage on 
fields and grazing 
of cattle 
Ensuring toilets 
for farm workers 
and people 










muscles in which 
incision must be 
made as wel as 












bovines > 6 weeks of 
age unless holding 
has been oficialy 




Only testing of  
Al bovines > 20 
months 
AND 
Bovines >8 months 
raised outdoors 
Findings wil be 
reported from the 
abattoir to the 
cattle producer, 
who wil be paid 
less or nothing for 
positive cattle 
depending on the 
judgment of the 
carcasses 
a: For both hazards, surveilance is a prerequisite for trade and export. b: EU Regulation 2015/1375 (Anon., 2015). c: although alowed for in the EU 643 
Meat Inspection Regulation 854/2004, such systems are not in place in the EU according to the knowledge of the authors. d: New EU Regulation 644 
2019/627 on meat inspection of bovines coming into force in December 2019 (Anon., 2019).  645 
